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10b-5 STANDING UNDER BIRNBAUM: THE
CASE OF THE MISSING REMEDY
The Birnbaum requirement' that a plaintiff be a purchaser or
seller of securities in order to have standing under section 10(b)2 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-51 promulgated
thereunder, has been the subject of active debate in recent years.4 The
1. In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952) the court first enunciated the requirement that a plaintiff in a
10b-5 action, in order to have standing, must be a purchaser or seller of securities.
See notes 16-18 and accompanying text infra.
2. Section 10(b) provides in part: 'It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange- . . . (b) To use
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1970).
3. Rule lob-5 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make, the statement
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1972).
4. There has been an abundance of law review material covering this question
in the last five years. See, e.g., Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The Search for a Limiting
Doctrine, 19 BuFFALo L. REv. 205 (1970); DeLancey, Rule lOb-5-A Recent Profile,
25 Bus. LAW. 1355 (1970); Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision
Where Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5 is Involved, 20 BrJFFALo L. REv. 93 (1970);
Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54
VA. L. Rnv. 268 (1968); Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law of Corporate
Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAw. 1289 (1971);
Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. REv. 543 (1971);
Comment, SEC Rule lOb-5-"In Connection With the Purchase or Sale of Any Security"
Restriction: Need for Analytical Precision, 5 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 28 (1969);
Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 684
(1968); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool for Determining
Standing Under Rule l0b-5, 56 GA. L. J. 1177 (1968); Comment, The Purchaser-
Seller Requirement of Rule 10b-5 Reevaluated, 44 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 151 (1972);
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limitation, although nominally followed in almost all federal courts,
has undergone gradual and conspicuous change.
The trend away from Birnbaum is not the result of dissatisfaction
with the theoretical tenets embodied in that decision. Indeed, most
courts continue, for a variety of reasons, to view the purchaser-seller
requirement as a legitimate limitation of federal jurisdiction in 1Ob-5
actions. Rather, the trend is the result of growing judicial realization
that a person may suffer an injury which deserves redress without ac-
tually having purchased or sold securities. In response to this realiza-
tion, the courts, instead of discarding the purchaser-seller requirement
entirely, have taken the middle ground of defining more persons as
being "purchasers" or "sellers." Thus, although Birnbaum survives in
theory, the class of persons who have standing to sue under lOb-5
nonetheless continues to expand.
This article will trace the judicial expansion of the purchaser-seller
rule and discuss the theoretical and practical considerations which jus-
tify retention of the basic Birnbaum framework. It will suggest that
the only valid consideration in determining standing under Rule lOb-5
is whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury as the result of
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Under
such an approach, the fact that the plaintiff is himself a purchaser or
seller would be only an indication of actual injury, but would not
be conclusive on the issue of standing under Rule lOb-5.
Implied Civil Liability
The dispute over standing to sue in lOb-5 actions began to be
significant only after the federal courts determined that private indi-
viduals had the right to sue for violations of the Rule. Both section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 appear to be criminal in nature, " and the Se-
curities Exchange Act grants a right of action for violation of the sec-
tion and Rule explicitly to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).6 Nonetheless, courts consistently have construed the provi-
sions as implying a private right of action since Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co.,7 and the Supreme Court has recently recognized the im-
Comment, The Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 14 VILL.
L. REV. 499 (1969).
5. At least one author has argued persuasively that Congress probably did not
intend section 10(b) to apply to private causes of action. See Ruder, Civil Liability
Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627
(1963). But see Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REv.
171 (1964).
6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
7. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (motion to dismiss denied), 73 F. Supp.
798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (opinion), 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (request for addi-
tional findings of fact affirmed; request for additional conclusions of law denied).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
plied right.
8
The Kardon court relied on tort law9 and statutory interpreta-
tion,'" but the theoretical justification for the recent recognition of the
private action is unclear. Apparently the private right is based pri-
marily on the equitable principles embodied in section 286 of the first
Restatement of Torts: remedial legislation intended to protect a certain
class will give a cause of action to members of that class who are in-
jured by the violation of the enactment."' The Supreme Court has
8. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
9. The Kardon court first relied on the Restatement of Torts § 286 (1934)
which provides that violations of a legislative enactment give rise to civil liability
where the purpose of the statute is to protect the particular interest of the person
harmed. See note 11 infra. The policy of the Restatement was considered so funda-
mental that where the right to a civil action in such a situation was "not expressly de-
nied the intention to withhold it should appear very clearly and plainly." 69 F. Supp.
at 514. The court rejected the argument that because other sections of the Securities
Exchange Act expressly provided civil remedies lOb-5 should not be construed to imply
a private remedy.
10. The Kardon court also relied on section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act which provides that contracts made in violation of the Act shall be void. "[A]
statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind shall be void almost necessarily
implies a remedy in respect of it." 69 F. Supp. at 514. Additionally, the court viewed
an amendment to section 29 providing a statute of limitations for 29(b) actions as
further evidence that Congress intended that the original statute provide civil remedies,
either in the form of an action for rescission or a suit for damages. Id.
Reliance on section 29(b) may be valid to justify a civil action where the fraud
of the defendant is in connection with the plaintiff's purchase from or sale to the
defendant. At one time such privity of contract, or at least a "semblance of priv-
ity," was required in all private lob-5 actions. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Tele.
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afrd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
More recent cases, however, almost unanimously reject the notion that privity must
be shown, but instead consider privity as an indication of causation. See Heit v.
Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969);
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 274 (S.D.
N.Y. 1972); Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
New Part Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). But see
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 66, 78-79 (M.D. Fla. 1972), appeal docketed,
No. 72-3055, 5th Cir., Dec. -, 1972. In actions where the plaintiff and defendant
are not in privity, therefore, the Kardon court's section 29(b) rationale would not
seem to justify the implied civil action.
11. "The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by
failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for the invasion of an interest of
another if: (a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an
interest of the other as an individual; and, (b) the interest invaded is one which the
enactment is intended to protect; and, (c) where the enactment is intended to pro-
tect an interest from a particular hazard, the invasion of the interests results from that
hazard; and, (d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not
so conducted himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action." RESTATE-
MENT oF TORTS § 286 (1934).
It seems apparent that § 286 originally was intended to apply to negligence ac-
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stated on several occasions that it will construe securities legislation
"not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes."' 2  When one of the primary purposes of the legislation is
the protection of investors, the court will imply the availability of judi-
cial relief "where necessary to achieve that result."' 3
The implied right to a private action is not limited to individuals.
Since section 10(b) allows the SEC to promulgate rules "in the public
interest" as well as "for the protection of investors,"' 4 the private right
of action will lie for corporations or for shareholders suing derivatively
on behalf of the corporation.' 5
Recognition of a private right of action under Rule 1Ob-5 did not,
however, answer the question of which persons were entitled to sue.
Birnbaum Doctrine
The question of which persons were entitled to sue under 1Ob-5
was answered in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.'6 In Birnbaum, the
Second Circuit set forth two major rules concerning 1Ob-5 actions,
one of which was a standing requirement.' 7  The court held that the
tions, relating to a standard of conduct for the reasonable man. Indeed, the revised
version of the section in the second Restatement so limits the doctrine. This fact has
not deterred courts from applying the principle to other than negligence cases, how-
ever. The court in Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339,
1342 (E.D.N-Y. 1970) noted that while section 286 relates primarily "to negligence
theory [it has] been used to support imposition of civil liability under various federal
statutes in a nonnegligence context. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Pan American World
Airways, 229 F.2d 499, 501 (2d Cir. 1956) (49 U.S.C. § 484(b), discrimination by
airlines); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947) 47 U.S.C.
§ 605, 'publishing' a telephone message) ....
On the subject of implied civil liability resulting from a criminal statute, see
generally 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 932-56 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969); Lown-
des, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361 (1932);
Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L REV. 453
(1933); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REV. 317 (1914);
Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the Creation of New Torts, 48 COLUM. L.
REv. 456 (1948).
12. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Super-
intendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
13. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (referring to section
14(a), but equally applicable to section 10(b)).
14. See note 2 supra.
15. See Hooper v. Mountain States See. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp.
261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
16. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
17. The second rule of Birnbaum dealt with the substantive elements of the
plaintiff's 10b-5 action. In deciding what type of actions were cognizable under sec-
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SEC's stated purpose in promulgating Rule lOb-5 was to protect pur-
chasers or sellers from fraudulent dealings connected with securities."8
Therefore only a plaintiff who could show that he was a purchaser or
tion 10(b), the court stated that the section was aimed at only those fraudulent prac-
tices "usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudu-
lent mismanagement of corporate affairs." 193 F.2d at 464. See note 55 infra.
For an excellent analysis of the distinction between the two rules set forth by the
Birnbaum court, see Comment, SEC Rule lOb---"In Connection With the Purchase
or Sale of Any Security" Restriction: Need for Analytical Precision, 5 COLUM. J. I. &
Soc. PROB. 28 (1969).
18. The Birnbaum court, in determining the legislative intent behind 10b-5, used
SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), which stated that rule 10b-5 was adopted to
close this "loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission
by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in
fraud in their purchase." The so-called "loophole" referred to in the Release was
that inherent in section 17(a), which provides, "(a) It shall be unlawful for any person
in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails,
directly or indirectly-(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
Thus, although 17(a) protected a buyer of securities, it did not mention sellers,
and apparently they were not within the coverage of the fraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act.
The statement made by Milton Freeman below also is enlightening in showing the
intent of the Commission in promulgating l0b-5. "It was one day in the year 1943,
I believe. I was sitting in my office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I
received a call from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the Trading and
Exchange Division. He said, 'I have just been on the telephone with Paul Rowen,'
who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in Boston, 'and he has told me
about the president of some company in Boston who is going around buying up the
stock of his company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been
telling them that the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are
going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there any-
thing we can do about it?' So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I
looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the
only discussion we had there was where 'in connection with the purchase or sale'
should be, and we decided it should be at the end." Conference on Codification of
the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967) (general discussion; Milton
Freeman, speaker).
There appears to be no serious doubt that the SEC primarily intended to close
the section 17(a) "loophole," but from this the Birnbaum court inferred that such
was the Commission's exclusive intent. An equally justifiable inference from the ex-
pansive language used in 10b-5 is that the SEC intended to extend protection to
"any person" defrauded "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities, and
that the Release used by the Birnbaum court was only a statement of motive for
promulgating lob-5 and was not meant to describe the sole purpose of lob-5.
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seller had standing in the federal courts to sue for violations of Rule
1Ob-5.
During the more than twenty years since Birnbaum was decided,
the federal courts have broadened the concepts of purchaser and seller
as well as purchase and sale. This trend, which has alarmed some
commentators as signaling the judicial creation of a federal law of cor-
porations, 9 is the topic to which this article now turns.
Expansion of the Purchaser-Seller Concepts
The federal courts have explicitly recognized that the definitions
of purchase and sale for lOb-5 standing purposes transcend the tradi-
tional concepts of those terms, as well as that a lOb-5 plaintiff need
not be a purchaser or seller in the traditional sense.2" In part this
recognition is due to the definitions of those terms within the Securities
Exchange Act,21 and in part due to judicial "activism" in cases where
the transaction so closely resembles a purchase or sale that it would be
patently unfair to disallow the plaintiff an action under lOb-5. The
major areas of expansion include: forced sellers, exchanges of shares
pursuant to a merger, and the so-called aborted purchasers and sellers.
Forced Sellers
The courts have generally allowed an individual standing as a
"seller" even though he has not actually parted with his shares, if he
can show that in the near future he will be compelled or "forced" to
sell because of the fraud of the defendant. This expansion of the con-
cept of seller is based on the rationale that a person who, by virtue of
the defendant's fraud, is faced solely with the alternatives of selling
at an economic loss or retaining securities which are worthless, closely
resembles an actual seller. Like the actual seller, the forced seller no
longer has control over the securities in question, and as a practical
matter he will be forced to sell his shares at a loss. A major problem
in this area is determining to what extent the defendant's fraud must
limit the plaintiff's selling alternatives in order for the latter to be con-
19. See generally Bahlman, Rule 10b-5: The Case for Its Full Acceptance as
Federal Corporation Law, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 727 (1968); Fleischer, "Federal Corpora-
tion Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1146 (1965); Ruder, Pitfalls in the
Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5,
59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964).
20. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 800 (5th Cir. 1970); Hooper
v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 203 (5th Cir. 1960).
21. "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, pur-
chase, or otherwise acquire." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a) (13) (1970). "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or
otherwise dispose of." Id. at § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970).
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sidered a forced seller. It is suggested that a forced sale should be
recognized whenever the defendant has fraudulently eliminated a free
market for the sale of plaintiff's shares.
The forced seller expansion was first announced in Vine v. Bene-
ficial Finance Co.2" Vine was a Class A shareholder in Crown Finance,
a company which was the target of a merger by Beneficial Finance.
He alleged that Beneficial and the officers and directors of Crown
fraudulently conspired to bring about the merger. Under the scheme
Beneficial first made premium payments to Class B shareholders, who
dominated the Crown board of directors. A substantially lower tender
offer was then made to Class A shareholders. Although Vine refused
the tender offer, 95 percent of the Class A shareholders did sell,
thereby allowing Beneficial to effect a statutory short form merger
without the approval of the remaining shareholders. After the merger,
Vine's alternatives were to sell the stock to Beneficial or to retain stock
in a nonexistent company. Thus, "as a practical matter [Vine] must
eventually become a party to a 'sale' as that term has always been
used. '23  The court felt that it would be a "needless formality"2 4 to re-
quire Vine to sell his shares before he sued.
The breadth of the forced sale of Vine remains a question. Con-
summated mergers 25 and liquidations26 which are fraudulently induced
represent clear-cut instances where the forced seller doctrine should be
applied, as it has been. In such cases the plaintiff is treated as a seller
because "the nature of his investment has been fundamentally changed
from an interest in a going enterprise into a right solely to a payment
of money for his shares. 27
On the other end of the spectrum are cases where the defend-
ant's fraudulent attempts to force the plaintiff to sell have not limited
plaintiffs selling alternatives by the time he brings his 10b-5 action.28
Although the plaintiff may claim that the value of his shares already
has been reduced, he is not yet faced with involuntary alternatives;
22. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
23. Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. E.g., Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D.
Del. 1965).
26. E.g., Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.
1970).
27. Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 307 (5th %ir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
28. See, e.g., Cooper v. Garza, 431 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1970) (activities
lowering the value of plaintiff's stock); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir.
1968) (attempted merger). But see Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp.
1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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he may sell to others, or he may retain shares in a going enterprise.
Courts have not allowed standing to the plaintiff in such situations
because he is not yet a seller, and the economic compulsion to sell is
not strong enough to elevate him to forced seller status. Moreover, the
plaintiff probably could obtain injunctive relief under the Mutual
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.29 doctrine to halt the defendant's fraudu-
lent conduct.
Between these degrees of compulsion are situations where the
plaintiffs shares have not been converted into a claim for cash as the
result of merger or liquidation, but where the defendant's fraud has
limited the market for the stock and the plaintiff is compelled, in a
practical sense, to sell at artificially low rates. In Travis v. Anthes
Imperial Limited30 the defendant Molson Industries, purchased 90 per-
cent of Anthes shares by means of a tender offer but fraudulently in-
duced the remaining holders of 10 percent of Anthes shares not to ten-
der in order to force these shareholders to sell later at a lower price.
The forced sale situation resulted because Molson's public announce-
ment of the merger produced a circumstance where "[an open market
for Anthes stock had ceased to exist, and the only possibility for the
sale of plaintiffs' stock was to Molson on Molson's terms.' The
Travis case appears to represent the outer limits of the forced seller
doctrine: an individual has standing to sue as a seller under Rule lOb-
5, even though he has not yet sold, if the defendant's fraud has elimi-
nated plaintiffs freedom of sale in practical effect by foreclosing mar-
kets otherwise available.
Merger
A shareholder of a target corporation who exchanges his stock
pursuant to a merger is at the same time a purchaser of the shares
he receives, and a seller of the shares he exchanges.32 When fraud
is employed to consummate the merger and the stockholder is thereby
harmed, he has standing to sue under lOb-5. The rationale is that
29. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). See notes 107-111 and accompanying text
infra.
30. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
31. Id. at 522-23.
32. E.g., SEC v. National See., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Mader v. Armel, 402
F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 903 (1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna
Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). See also Knauff v.
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 408 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1969); In re Penn Cent_ Sec.
Litigation, 349 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc.,
293 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Simon v. New Haven Bd. & Carton Co., 250 F.




the Securities Exchange Act defines purchase"3 to include "otherwise
acquiring" shares, and sale34 to include "otherwise disposing of" shares.
Accordingly, a merger constitutes both a purchase and sale because it
involves the disposition and acquisition of shares. Including the ex-
change of securities pursuant to a merger within the concept of "pur-
chase" and "sale" is logically consistent. If the approval of a merger
operates as a fraud upon the stockholders, their rights in securities will
be affected in the same manner as if the fraud had been employed
to induce them personally to purchase or sell securities.
35
However, a stockholder in the "surviving"--as distinguished from
the "target" or "disappearing"-corporation does not exchange shares
pursuant to the merger. Such a shareholder, it would seem, could not
bring an individual lOb-5 action, but would have to sue derivatively on
behalf of the surviving corporation, for in such a situation only the
corporation is a purchaser or seller. Nonetheless, it is submitted that
in the merger situation, the difference in status between shareholders
should not be determinative of standing to sue for violations of 10b-5,
for either class of shareholders may sustain equal financial injury by
virtue of fraud which induces them to consent to the merger. Thus,
the test of standing for the surviving as well as disappearing share-
holder should be the same: has the shareholder sustained an actual
injury as a result of the defendant's fraud?
It might be argued also that a shareholder in the surviving corpo-
ration is a "seller" because the merger decreases his percentage own-
ership in the corporation. Such an assertion seems unsound as well
as unnecessary. Nothing in the wording or history of the Act, nor
indeed in its interpretation by the courts, would justify such an am-
bitious construction of the term "sale."3 6
33. See note 21 supra.
34. Id.
35. The Supreme Court has used the following language in expressing the policy
rationale behind the recognition of a merger as a purchase and sale: "Whatever the
terms 'purchase' and 'sale' may mean in other contexts, here an alleged deception has
affected individual shareholders' decisions in a way not at all unlike that involved in a
typical cash sale or share exchange. The broad antifraud purposes of the statute and
the rule would clearly be furthered by their application to this type of situation."
SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969).
36. In Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 1970), the
plaintiff sought to be classified as a "purchaser" because the corporation in which he
held stock had repurchased some of its outstanding shares and thereby increased the
plaintiff's proportionate percentage ownership of the corporation. The court allowed
standing on other grounds, but intimated that it might recognize the plaintiff's alterna-
tive theory of standing by stating that he was "perhaps a purchaser." Other courts
have required that the plaintiff be a direct party to an exchange. See, e.g., Dyer v.
Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 912 (N.D. Me. 1971); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd,
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In the only case found in which a court granted shareholders in
the surviving corporation lOb-5 standing, the theory relied on was not
that the surviving shareholders were "sellers," but rather that they
should be treated equally with shareholders of the target corporation.
In Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co.,37 the plaintiff and all five sharehold-
ers of the target corporation were the sole shareholders in the surviving
corporation. The exchange ratio allegedly favored the disappearing
company, and the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had concealed
facts necessary for her to consent intelligently to the merger. The
court recognized the difference between the statutory purchaser-seller
status of shareholders of a target corporation and the nonpurchaser-
seller status of shareholders of a surviving corporation. Nevertheless,
the court created an exception to the Birnbaum limitation on the
ground that the "purposes and spirit" of the 1934 Act compelled that
in the merger situation "shareholders of both the disappearing and the
surviving corporations [be given] the same remedies . "... 1 De-
spite the absence of clear authority for the Nanfito decision, the result
reached seems entirely desirable as a matter of social policy.
Delayed and Aborted Sellers
The plaintiff who alleges he would have sold his securities at a
certain time but for the fraud of the defendant is most often labelled
an "aborted seller" by courts and commentators. There are actually
two types of plaintiffs who are fraudulently induced not to sell their
shares: (1) the "delayed" seller who, subsequent to the fraud, ac-
tually does sell his shares; and, (2) the true aborted seller, who still
has not sold his shares at the time he sues. For lOb-5 standing pur-
poses, the distinction is significant.
In the case of the delayed seller, the Birnbaum purchaser-seller
requirement is met since there has in fact been a sale. There remains
the question of whether the fraud of the defendant "caused" the sub-
sequent sale. Some courts have disallowed standing to the delayed
430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 6 (1971). The latter
view is probably the better interpretation of the meaning of the terms 'purchase' and
,sale' in the Act. If the proportionate increase or decrease in ownership theory is
adopted, shareholders in a corporation will be "purchasers" or "sellers" whenever the
corporation deals in its own shares. It is difficult to believe that Congress intended
those terms to be interpreted so expansively. Such an interpretation involves the
courts in a legal fiction which would be unnecessary if Birnbaum were discarded and
the plaintiff in a 10b-5 action were not required to be a purchaser or seller in order to
have standing.
37. 341 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1972) (motion for summary judgment), 473
F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973).
38. Id. at 238. The plaintiff's action in Nanfito was disallowed on other grounds,
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed both the ultimate disposition of the case and the
resolution of the standing question. 473 F.2d 537, 541 n.6 (8th Cir. 1973).
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seller on this ground, reasoning that the fraud is "in connection with"
the inducement not to sell rather than in connection with the later
sale.5 9 However, the trend in delayed seller situations is for the courts
to connect the later sale with the fraud and thereby allow the plaintiff
10b-5 standing.4"
In the case of the true aborted seller, no actual sale has taken
place and standing will be denied unless there has been a sale in the
statutory sense.4 As indicated, there is a sale in the statutory sense
whenever a shareholder has entered into a contract to sell shares, since
section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act includes within the defi-
nition of "sale" a contract "to sell or otherwise dispose of" shares.42
39. In Hirsch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 1283
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), and Baehr v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1971-
1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,227, at 91, 411 (S.D.N.Y.
June 29, 1970), the plaintiffs held stock in McDonnell Douglas and alleged that the
corporation issued a report indicating earnings of $.85 per share, when in fact the
earnings were lower. The corporation advised Merrill Lynch of the lower earnings,
which passed the infomation on to a select group of customers who sold their shares
in Douglas. Days later, Douglas announced publicly the sharp drop in earnings, but
by this time the stock had dropped from $87 to $76 per share. The plaintiffs in both
cases subsequently sold their shares at a loss, but neither 10b-5 action was allowed on
the ground that the defendants' concealment was not "in connection with" the plain-
tiffs' sales.
40. See notes 44-56 and accompanying text infra.
41. There appears to be only one true "aborted" seller case where the court has
allowed the plaintiff standing to maintain a lob-5 action without requiring that he be
a party to a contract to sell. In Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,591, at 98,701 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31,
1969), a tender offer was made by International Controls for the stock of share-
holders of Electronic Specialty. The plaintiffs alleged that Electronic made false
and misleading statements to its shareholders in an effort to discourage the success of
the tender offer. Relying on the advice of the house counsel of Electronic, the plain-
tiffs attempted to accept the tender offer by telegram. This mode of acceptance was
not permitted by the terms of the International offer, and the acceptances, were invalid.
The court allowed standing to the class of plaintiffs who relied on the advice of
the house .ounsel and attempted telegraphic acceptance of the tender offer. The court
interpreted Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc. (see notes 107-111 and accompany-
ing text infra) as holding that the Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement was in-
applicable in an action for damages where the plaintiff could show "exact proof and
measure of damages, and . . . the causal connection between the alleged wrong and
plaintiff's loss." [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,591, at
98,703.
One commentator has suggested that the case of A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,
375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) was also an instance where the court allowed standing to a
true aborted seller. See Comment, The Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement
of Rule 10b-5, 14 VMLL. L. REv. 499, 506 (1969). Actually, the plaintiff in that case,
while an aborted seller vis-a-vis the defendant, was an actual seller of securities, and
does not fit into the aborted seller category. See notes 80-81 and accompanying text
infra.
42. See note 34 supra.
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Thus, persons who have standing to sue under 10b-5 are those share-
holders who eventually have sold or otherwise disposed of shares, or
those who, even though they have not sold, have entered into a contract
to sell or otherwise dispose of shares. Failing to recognize the dis-
tinction between delayed and aborted sellers, some courts have required
the contractual relationship in all cases where the plaintiff has been
fraudulently induced to hold his shares, regardless of whether he ulti-
mately sells his shares. 3
Though no court has explicitly differentiated between delayed and
aborted sellers, it appears that such a distinction has begun to emerge.
In Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co.,44 the plaintiff alleged that he told his
stockbroker he desired to sell shares of Alside stock and that the broker
actively induced him to refrain from selling for five months by making
affirmative misrepresentations concerning Alside's financial status. The
court, in allowing the 1Ob-5 action, stated that the words " 'in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security' . . . do not require that
the purchase or sale immediately follow the alleged fraud."45
In Opper v. Hancock Securities Corp.,4 6 the plaintiff gave his
broker an order to sell certain shares. The broker did not sell the
customer's shares, but instead sold his own holdings in the same com-
pany. The plaintiff eventually sold his securities at a loss4 7 and the
court allowed him to sue under lOb-5. Although not discussing the
purchaser-seller requirement, the court emphasized that the broker ob-
viously "violated its duties under the 1934 Act . . . and that these vio-
lations would be sufficient without more to sustain plaintiff's suit."'4 8
In Silverman v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,49 the plaintiff and his broker
agreed that the broker would sell any stocks in the customer's account
which incurred a small loss, rather than retain the shares and hope
for eventual recovery. The plaintiff alleged that the broker delayed in
selling certain warrants and debentures because the defendant had sim-
ilar holdings and did not wish to cause a further decline in the market
43. E.g., Mt. Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1972)
(dictum). See notes 58-60 and accompanying text infra.
44. 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
45. Id. at 219.
46. 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966).
47. "Loss," as that term is used here, does not necessarily mean that the sale
price was less than the original purchase price. Rather, loss is measured by the dif-
ference between the price at which the plaintiff eventually sells and the price at
which he would have sold but for the fraud of the defendant. In Opper, the court
measured damages as the difference in the price which plaintiff realized on the sale
and the market price at the time of the fraud. Id. at 676-77.
48. Id. at 673-74.
49. 331 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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by selling the customer's account. Following Stockwell, the court ruled
that the plaintiff had standing to bring a 10b-5 action.
Stockwell, Opper and Silverman, all district court opinions, stand
for the proposition that a defendant's fraud need not be concurrent
with the sale of securities in order to be considered "in connection
with" the sale. Nonetheless, this line of cases has been rationalized by
the Ninth Circuit on the basis that in each case there was a contractual
relationship "between the parties which elevated the plaintiffs to the
status of statutory purchasers or sellers."50  In Travis v. Anthes Im-
perial Limited,5 however, the Eighth Circuit allowed standing to a de-
layed seller who was not contractually related to the defendant, thus
implicitly recognizing that the delayed seller satisfies the Birnbaum re-
quirement because he is an actual, as opposed to a statutory, seller.
The Travis plaintiffs, who were U.S. residents, alleged that Molson In-
dustries, a corporation which had made a tender offer to acquire Anthes
stock, fraudulently induced them not to sell their shares of Anthes
common stock to Molson. After Molson succeeded in acquiring most
of the Canadian-held Anthes stock, the plaintiffs sold to Molson, but
at terms substantially less favorable than those offered the Canadian
holders. The trial court ruled the plaintiffs did not have standing un-
der 10b-5 because they "were not induced to purchase or sell their
Anthes shares as a result of defendants' alleged misrepresentations." 52
The fact that the plaintiffs later did sell their shares did "not compel
a different conclusion."53
The Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court, basing its opinion in
part on the reasoning of Stockwell. 4  The fact that plaintiffs ulti-
mately sold their shares satisfied the standing requirement, since the
sale need not be concurrent with the fraud in order to be "in connec-
tion with" it.
55
50. Mt. Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1972) (empha-
sis added).
51. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
52. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 797, 804 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
53. Id.
54. The court also felt the plaintiffs could be allowed standing on the alternative
ground that they were "forced sellers" within the doctrine expressed in Vine v. Bene-
ficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). See
notes 22-31 and accompanying text supra.
55. The Birnbaum court, in considering what types of actions were recognized
under section 10(b), interpreted the "in connection with" clause rather rigidly and
held that the section was aimed at only those fraudulent practices "usually associated
with the sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of
corporate affairs." 193 F.2d at 464. This consideration differs from the procedural
question of who is a purchaser-seller in that it involves the substantive element of the
plaintiffs cause of action. The court's interpretation of the "in connection with"
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If the plaintiff alleges an injury and shows a sale, the trend seems
to be to allow him to prove that the sale was "in connection with" the
clause seems to have undergone expansion in two ways, both of which are inherent in
the recent Supreme Court case of Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971).
First, actionable fraud is no longer limited to that which is "usually" associated
with the purchase or sale of securities, but includes all fraudulent practices, "whether
the artifices employed involved a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form
of deception." A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967). Thus, a
1Ob-5 action by the seller against the purchaser for nonpayment of the purchase price
will lie if the seller alleges that the purchaser entered into the transaction with no in-
tention to pay the purchase price. See id.; Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. 997
(N.D. Tex. 1972); Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (by implication). But see E.L. Aaron & Co. v. Free, [Current Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,598, at 92,755 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1972). The major effect of
this expansion of the type of fraud cognizable under lOb-5, however, is in the area of
corporate fraud. Generally, the courts will no longer dismiss a lob-5 claim in a
derivative action on the ground that it involves only a mismanagement of corporate
affairs, if the fraud involved is related to a securities transaction. Bankers Life
recognized the basic principle "that Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate
transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement." 404
U.S. at 12. The Court, nevertheless, stated, "[D]isregard of trust relationships by
those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries, are all a single seamless web along
with manipulation, investor's ignorance, and the like." Id. at 6. Moreover, the fraud
alleged may be in affirmative acts of misrepresentation, nondisclosure, or the sale of
securities by the corporation to an insider for inadequate consideration. See, e.g.,
Jannes v. Microwave Communication, Inc., 461 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1972).
Second, it appears that it is no longer required that the fraud be intrinsic to the
immediate securities transaction itself. As expressed by the Stockwell court, "[tihe
words 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security' . . . do not require that
the purchase or sale immediately follow the alleged fraud." Stockwell v. Reynolds &
Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See, e.g., Drachman v. Harvey, 453
F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972).
Drachman involved a shareholder's derivative suit wherein the plaintiff alleged
that Harvey, the controlling shareholder of Harvey Aluminum (Aluminum), conspired
with Martin Marietta Corp. (Marietta) to give Marietta control over Aluminum. The
scheme involved two phases, the first of which was the sale by Harvey to Marietta
of 2.9 million shares of Aluminum owned by Harvey at $11.20 per share above the
current market value. Harvey, in pursuance of phase two, allegedly convinced the
directors of Aluminum to call back its entire issue of 51 percent convertible deben-
tures at a cost of $6.6 million, even though the issues were not due, and even though
Aluminum was concurrently borrowing money for its working capital at a rate as high
as 9 percent.
The effect of the recall was to increase Marietta's percentage holdings in Alumi-
num, and to take away the possibility of conversion of the debentures into common
stock, a contingency which would dilute Marietta's percentage holding.
At the original hearing in Drachman the lOb-5 claim was rejected on the ground
that the "premium bribe" to Harvey and the recall of the debentures were two iso-
lated transactions. The sale of control by use of the premium bribe did not involve
the corporation as a buyer or seller, and though the redemption of the debentures did
involve a purchase, there was no fraud connected with this latter transaction. "10(b)
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fraud. The recognition of this approach in Stockwell, Opper, Silver-
man and Travis stems from the realization that a "seller is injured as
much when he suffers a loss on the sale of securities Which he has been
fraudulently induced to retain as when he is fraudulently induced to
sell them."56s When there has been no actual sale, Birnbaum still re-
quires that a plaintiff be a seller in the statutory sense in order to have
standing under 10b-5.
57
Delayed and Aborted Purchasers
The standing considerations mentioned in the preceding section
regarding delayed and aborted sellers should apply with equal force
where the fraud is in connection with a purchase. Thus, where the
plaintiff alleges he was fraudulently induced to refrain from purchasing
securities, he can be classified as either a "delayed purchaser," where
subsequent to the fraud he ultimately buys the securities, or an
"aborted purchaser," where he has not purchased the securities by the
time he sues. The delayed purchaser should be deemed to have stand-
ing as an actual purchaser, but the true aborted purchaser should be
deemed to have standing only when he has entered into a contractual
relationship to purchase or otherwise to acquire shares so that the
transaction fits within the statutory definition of purchase.;" Since
there is little case law involving delayed purchasers, discussion here is
limited to the type of contractual relationship which satisfies the statu-
liability arises only when the alleged fraud between the parties and/or alleged market
manipulation or deception is intrinsic to the securities transaction itself." 453 F.2d
at 732 (emphasis added).
The court on rehearing, however, upheld the right of action under 10b-5, stating
that "a sufficient claim is stated of fraud against the corporation in connection with
the redemption of the debentures, a 'purchase' within the meaning of the statute and
rule." Id. at 737. The rehearing resulted because the Supreme Court had recently re-
versed the Second Circuit holding in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971), rev'g 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970). That case made it clear that
the fraud alleged need not be intrinsic to the sale, but that it was sufficient that the
seller "suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securi-
ties. . . ." Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
It is apparent that many courts since Birnbaum have loosened the causal link re-
quired between the purchase or sale and the alleged fraud. The fraud which induces
the plaintiff to refrain from entering into a securities transaction may very well be
"in connection" with that person's later entry into the securities market.
56. Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
57. In similar cases where no subsequent sale was involved, standing has been
denied. E.g., Edelman v. Decker, 337 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Morrow v.
Shapiro, 334 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Sanders v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sue. L. REP. f 93,226, at 91,409
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1970); Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F.
Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
58. See note 33 supra.
April 1973"1
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tory definition of purchase and thus enables a true aborted purchaser
to sue under 1Ob-5.
The principle that a true aborted purchaser must have entered into
a contract to buy or otherwise acquire shares was recently affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit in Mt. Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell.59 The
plaintiff claimed that it was precluded from bidding on and purchasing
securities at a sheriff's auction because of the defendant's misrepre-
sentations that the securities were worthless. In denying the plaintiff
standing, the court stated that aborted purchasers or sellers would be
allowed 10b-5 standing only where they were a party to a contract to
purchase or otherwise acquire shares.6"
[The] unifying element [of cases where aborted purchasers have
been allowed standing] is the existence of a contractual relation-
ship between the parties which elevated the plaintiffs to the status
of statutory purchasers .... 1
Two cases where the plaintiff aborted purchasers met this con-
tractual requirement are Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc.62
and Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co. 63  In Commerce, the plaintiff en-
tered into a contract with the defendants to purchase all the stock of
defendants' corporation. The agreement was never consummated by
actual sale, however, because the defendants' wrongfully sold to a third
party. The court rejected the defendants' contention that the plain-
tiffs did not have standing because they had not actually purchased the
stock.
Although it has been suggested that an action under §10(b) of
the Exchange Act and SEC Rule lOb-5 may not be founded upon
an aborted agreement to buy or sell securities . . . .the law in
the law in [the Second] Circuit and elsewhere now appears to be es-
tablished that it is unnecessary to prove a consummated, or closed,
purchase or sale as condition to the institution of such a suit.
64
The court reasoned that because the statute read "in connection with
the purchase or sale," rather than "in the purchase or sale," it indi-
cated that Congress "intended to protect against fraud in agreements
to buy or sell, as well as with respect to completed sales, provided
damages could be shown."' '65
59. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
60. Undoubtedly the court was correct insofar as it was describing cases in-
volving true aborted purchasers and sellers. From the cases cited, however, the court's
opinion makes clear that it was also applying the contractual relationship test to de-
layed purchasers and sellers-an application which is unwarranted in view of the
Stockwell, Opper, Silverman and Travis decisions. See notes 44-56 and accompanying
text supra.
61. 464 F.2d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1972).
62. 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
63. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
64. 290 F. Supp. 715, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
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In Goodman, the defendant-broker "sold" the plaintiffs nonex-
istent securities and falsely represented that he had made certain other
purchases which the plaintiff had ordered. Although technically there
was no actual purchase or sale, the plaintiffs' 10b-5 action was al-
lowed, for they were "actual parties to transactions which, [but] for
the fraud of [the broker], would have been actual purchases or sales
Thus, a contract to purchase will satisfy the Birnbaum purchaser-
seller requirement, but it is not clear whether something less than an
actual contract to purchase will suffice. In Ashton v. Thornley Realty
Co. 67 the court seemed to answer this question in the affirmative.
Ashton involved a plaintiff with an irrevocable 90-day option to pur-
chase shares in a cooperative apartment. The plaintiff claimed that he
had been induced not to exercise the option within the 90-day period
by the misrepresentations contained in the cooperative corporation's
prospectus. In allowing the plaintiff standing, the court noted that the
"jurisdictional question [was] by no means free from doubt," 68 but,
[T]he fact that Ashton had an irrevocable right, presumably spe-
cifically enforceable, to buy shares of the cooperative for a period
of 90 days placed him (during the 90 day period) in a status
beyond that of a mere aborted purchaser . . . . and that his en-
forceable option to purchase the shares may well constitute a "con-
tract to buy" for the purposes of § 10(b) liability.69
A similar case where lOb-5 standing was denied, however, is
is Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps." The plaintiffs, retail users
of Blue Chip Stamps, were given the right of first refusal to an offer-
ing of Blue Chip common stock, pursuant to a court order compelling
Blue Chip to reorganize. The plaintiffs did not purchase the new
shares, but alleged they had been dissuaded from doing so by state-
ments in the defendant's prospectus which had undervalued its income
and net earnings. The court disallowed the action on the ground that
the causal relation between the fraud and the alleged injury appeared
difficult to prove.
[Tihe causal nexus between defendants' alleged misrepresenta-
tions and plaintiff's failure to purchase the Blue Chip "units" de-
pends upon a number of highly uncertain factors such as proof
that but for defendants' misrepresentations plaintiff would have,
66. 265 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. IM. 1967) (emphasis added).
67. 346 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d 647 (2nd Cir. 1973).
68. Id. at 1299.
69. Id. at 1299 n.4. Defendant's summary judgment motion was granted, how-
ever, for the misrepresentations alleged by the plaintiff did not constitute actionable
fraud under 10b-5.
70. 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-2223, 9th Cir.,
July 15, 1971.
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indeed, purchased the offered "units;" . . . in view of this un-
certainty, damages herein appear highly speculative. .... 71
The Manor Drug Stores court did not, therefore, consider the is-
sue, presented in Ashton, whether an irrevocable right to purchase se-
curities fits within the statutory definition of "purchase." This issue
has not been definitively answered by the courts, but the approach
taken by the Ashton court indicates a willingness to expand the term
"purchaser" beyond situations where there is either a purchase or a
contract to purchase. This willingness is further evidence of the judi-
cial trend to liberalize the Birnbaum rule by including more persons
within the classifications of purchaser and seller.
In summary, liberalization of 10b-5 standing requirements in sit-
uations where the plaintiff is fraudulently induced to refrain from pur-
chasing securities may take place in the following fashion. Courts
will regard a plaintiff who subsequently buys as a delayed purchaser,
and recognize that there has been an actual purchase for purposes of
Birnbaum. Such a plaintiff is the counterpart of the delayed sellers
who were accorded standing in Stockwell, Opper, Silverman and
Travis72 on the theory that the "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security" clause of 1Ob-5 does "not require that the purchase
or sale immediately follow the alleged fraud. ' 73  A person who does
not subsequently buy may still be deemed a purchaser if he is a party
to a contract to purchase, and perhaps if he holds an irrevocable right
to purchase within a specified period.
Aborted Purchaser Variation: Unsuccessful
Contenders for Control
The tender offer is a modem method of corporate acquisition by
which an attacking corporation attempts a takeover of a "target" firm
by offering to buy shares from the existing shareholders in the target
corporation. If the takeover is unsuccessful, the tender offeror may
sue under 10b-5, claiming that failure to obtain majority control was
caused by the fraud of the target corporation. Whether the tender of-
feror has standing where the fraud of the target corporation prevents
the takeover is, at present, a difficult question due to the seeming ir-
reconciliability of the two major cases on the subject. Adding further
complexity to the problem is the fact that some courts are reluctant to
enter into battles for corporate control when the competing corpora-
tions are equals, and such reluctance may color court decisions on the
standing issue. Ultimately, claims of fraud in connection with tender
71. Id. at 40.
72. See notes 44-56 and accompanying text supra.
73. Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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offers may be resolved under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act which recently was enacted to deal with tender offer situations.
Current case law indicates that the standing requirements under section
14(e) may be less stringent than under lOb-5. Since the case law
under 14(e) is relatively undeveloped, however, the present discus-
sion considers only the role of 1Ob-5 actions in this area.
The first major case on point is Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syra-
cuse China Corp.74 where Iroquois made a tender offer to the stock-
holders of Syracuse China for their shares in that corporation. Iro-
quois alleged that the officers of Syracuse fraudulently induced the
shareholders to retain their shares by misrepresenting the future pros-
pects of Syracuse. The court, reaffirming Birnbaum,7 15 denied stand-
ing to Iroquois. Even though Iroquois had made some purchases of
Syracuse stock pursuant to the tender offer, it did not claim that it
was misled as to those transactions, and therefore was not a purchaser
for purposes of Birnbaum. Rather, Iroquois claimed that because of
the fraud perpetrated on Syracuse shareholders, it was precluded from
purchasing additional shares. Iroquois, then, stands for the proposition
that an unsuccessful contender for control cannot maintain a lOb-5
action by relying solely on aborted purchaser status.
In Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,76 however, the
same court allowed standing to the unsuccessful contender for control
in a factual situation resembling Iroquois. There, Crane made a tender
offer to Air Brake stockholders. Crane alleged that Air Brake and
Standard, a company with which Air Brake desired to merge, fraudu-
lently conspired to defeat Crane's tender offer by having Standard pur-
chase Air Brake stock on the open market on the final day Air Brake
shareholders could accept Crane's tender offer. The purchases drove
the market price of Air Brake stock to a level higher than the Crane
offer. As further evidence of the fraudulent scheme, Crane alleged
that Standard, on the same day it had purchased the Air Brake stock,
secretly sold a substantial portion of these same shares at a heavy loss.
As a result of Standard's fraudulent manipulation of the market,
Crane's attempted takeover of Air Brake ended in acquisition of only
a minority of the outstanding shares. Crane was allowed standing to
sue for the alleged violations of both section 9(a)(2) and Rule lOb-5.
The results reached in Crane and Iroquois, at first blush, may ap-
pear irreconcilable. In each instance the plaintiff was a tender offeror
whose attempts to purchase securities had been aborted. The conflict-
ing results seem especially baffling in view of the fact that Iroquois
74. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
75. Id. at 967.
76. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
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was decided only five weeks prior to Crane, by the same Circuit, and
a rehearing in Iroquois was denied on the same day Crane was decided.
One possible distinction between the cases is that in Crane the
defendants, Air Brake and Standard, completed their merger. Crane,
as a minority shareholder in Air Brake, was forced to exchange its
Air Brake shares for Standard shares as a result of the merger of Air
Brake into Standard. Because Crane and Standard were competitors,
Crane was then forced to sell its Standard shares in order to avoid anti-
trust complications. Thus, although Crane was not allowed standing
as an aborted purchaser, it was allowed to maintain a 10b-5 suit as a
forced seller.
77
It is unclear, however, how far the Crane concept extends. Had
Crane not been forced to divest itself of Standard shares because of
the antitrust laws, would it have been allowed standing as a purchaser
or seller because of the merger between Air Brake and Standard? One
court has intimated that a merger in such a situation would be enough
to elevate an unsuccessful contender for control to "seller" status, 78 and
there seems to be no logical reason or policy which compels a different
result. Indeed, why not carry the concept one step further and allow
the unsuccessful contender for control seller status for 10b-5 purposes
if, after the tender offer is defeated, it sells the shares it has bought
pursuant to the attempt to gain majority control?
Two problems arise in this context. First, the sale which follows
77. Though the Crane court spoke of the forced seller concept, it is unclear
whether 10b-5 standing was allowed on this ground. Certain language of the court
seems to apply the forced seller concept only to the 9(a)(2) action. "Standard's ac-
tions had the intended and inevitable effect of inducing Crane to become a forced
seller within the meaning of section 9(a) (2) .... Standard's failure to disclose its
manipulation operated as a fraud or deceit on Crane in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities, creating a right to relief in Crane quite apart from Crane's rights
as a forced seller under section 9(a) (2)." Id. "The success of Standard's maneuver
made Crane a forced seller of the newly issued Standard convertible preferred under
threat of a divestiture action to be brought by Standard. . . . Thus, we have here in
Crane one induced to sell by Standard's deception and manipulation and so within
the protection of section 9(a)(2). Moreover, even if a narrower view were taken of
9(a)(2), it would seem that Standard's conduct would still be actionable under Rule
lOb-5(c), condemning conduct which operates as a fraud or deceit 'upon any per-
son.' " Id. at 798.
Confusion on this point shows itself in an action based on the same set of facts.
See American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y., 1972).
See also H.K. Porter Co. v. Nickolson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972)
(supplemental opinion). There seems to be no valid reason, however, to limit the
forced seller concept to only one phase of the action, for one who is a forced seller for
9(a) (2) purposes logically should also be a forced seller under lob-5.
78. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128, 1133
n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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the takeover attempt may not be the true cause for the unsuccessful
tender offeror's complaint. That is, the injury to the plaintiff in such
a case appears to be caused by the defeat of the tender offer and not
by the fact he sold the shares he acquired as a result of the unsuccess-
ful takeover attempt.79  Arguably, the fraud is "in connection with"
the aborted purchase and not in connection with the later sale of the
shares acquired. Nevertheless, this consideration will probably not
cause too many courts great difficulty. An analogous situation arose
in A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perow° where a broker sued a customer who
allegedly gave the broker an order for shares with the intent to consum-
mate the purchase only in the event that the market price of the stock
rose. The fraud was thus in connection with the plaintiff's sale of
securities. The court stated that plaintiff was "clearly a purchaser
of securities,"81 since he had had to buy the securities from others in
order to sell later to the defendant.
Thus, although in the unsuccessful contender for control situa-
tion the defendant's fraud is in connection with the immediate securities
transaction-the plaintiff's tender offer-it may also be said to be "in
connection with" the plaintiff's later sale of the shares acquired. In
terms of causation, the later sale may be viewed as part of a single
transaction so that the defendant's fraud "touches" the sale.
8 2
The second problem is more substantial. Where, as in Crane,
two companies make competing bids for corporate control, the active
trading in that stock may raise its market value so that by the time
the losing contender is faced with sale of whatever shares he has man-
aged to buy, he could realize a profit on the transaction. For exam-
ple, Crane's sale of Standard shares because of antitrust considera-
tions produced a profit of several million dollars.83 Thus, although
Crane might be considered a "seller" and therefore satisfy the Birn-
baum requirement, the question remains whether it suffered any actual
injury. Presumably Crane gladly would have exchanged its profit for
corporate control of Air Brake, but the question remains whether the
loss of corporate control is a cognizable injury under 1Ob-5. 84
79. See Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to
Sue Under Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 93, 100 (1970); Whitaker,
The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. REv. 543, 566-67 (1971).
80. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
81. Id. at 397 n.3.
82. See note 55 supra.
83. 419 F.2d at 791.
84. On remand, Crane claimed damages on five grounds: (1) the difference in
value between the Air Brake shares and the Standard shares Crane received in ex-
change for them due to the merger; (2) similar damages as to the Air Brake stock
Crane was prevented from acquiring; (3) the control value of Air Brake; (4) "the
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An additional factor to consider in regard to standing in tender
offer situations is the fact that most courts are not as willing to "find"
a purchase or sale where only corporate entities are involved in the dis-
pute. As stated in one decision,
[T]his Court [has] made it clear that it would not, at the behest
of a disappointed contender in a battle for corporate control, nec-
essarily take the same view of the requirements of the securities
laws and rules as it does in cases of claimed injury to the average
public investor.8
5
One reason for the reluctance of the courts to enter into battles
for corporate control stems from the fact that the purpose of the Ex-
change Act "is to give the investing public the opportunity to make
knowing and intelligent decisions regarding the purchase or sale of se-
curities. '8 6  When two corporations are involved in a battle for con-
trol, it is assumed that neither has superior knowledge, and each has
readied itself for the onslaught. The policy disfavoring a caveat emp-
tor approach in securities dealings is therefore not as strong here, and
the courts may employ the Birnham purchase-seller requirement to
avoid involvement in intercorporate disputes.
However, application of the purchaser-seller rule in such a case
works an injustice on the corporate shareholders who are injured as a
result of the battle, for they probably would have no remedy in such
situations under traditional Birnbaum standards. In a situation like
Iroquois, for example, where A Corporation offers to buy the shares
held by the stockholders in B Corporation, and the officers of B fraud-
ulently induce nontender, it is doubtful that the stockholders, as true
aborted sellers, will have independent 1Ob-5 standing. This is true
even though the stockholders suffer an injury to the extent of the dif-
ference between the tender offer price and the value of the retained
shares when the offer expires. Courts conceivably could remedy this
injustice either by allowing the stockholders standing under new section
14(e) which deals specifically with fraud in connection with a tender
offer,87 or by discarding the 1Ob-5 purchaser-seller requirement. It
loss which Crane allegedly suffered from the forced sale of its Air Brake [Standard?]
stock, for antitrust reasons;" and, (5) punitive damages. Crane Co. v. American
Standard, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 766, 769-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
85. Bangor Punta Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1147, 1152
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). Accord, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F.
Supp. 1128, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
86. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950
(1970) (emphasis added).
87. Section 14(e) reads, "It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts
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appears probable that the courts will adopt the former approach be-
fore they consider the latter.
Birnbaum as a Limiting Doctrine
As the preceding sections have shown, the liberalization of the
purchaser-seller rule has taken place from within. That is, the courts
have generally deviated from the rule by expanding the definitions of
the terms purchaser and seller rather than making external exceptions
to the rule. The distinction is, for the most part, a semantic one since
the result in either case would be the same: an enlarged class of plain-
tiffs is allowed access to the federal courts for injuries resulting from
10b-5 violations. The expansion of the lOb-5 class of plaintiffs is in-
dicative of a judicial movement away from insistence that the plaintiff
actually be a member of a "purchaser or seller class." This move-
ment represents a recognition that persons who are in fact injured by
another's fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
ought to have redress. 88
On the other hand, most courts retain the basic outline of the
purchaser-seller requirement both because they feel there are legitimate
reasons for its continuation, and because they wish to maintain a de-
gree of control over who will be plaintiffs in 10b-5 actions. This sec-
tion will focus on the judicial considerations which are used to justify
the retention of Birnbaum, and will suggest that none of these consid-
erations are relevant to the question of standing to sue.
The Birnbaum requirement can be termed a "limiting doctrine"
or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or
any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, re-
quest, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by
rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such
acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). The section is relatively new
and its effect on lob-5 is as yet unknown. The Iroquois court felt that the new
section was at least an indication of Congressional intent that "in tender offer contests
such as that at bar there was no standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 by either the
tender offeror or by the target corporation." 417 F.2d at 969 (emphasis added).
Other courts have used 14(e) as an alternative to lOb-5, available when the plaintiff
cannot satisfy the purchaser-seller standing requirement. Cf. Electronic Specialty
Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1969); H.K. Porter
Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153, 162-65 (D.R.L 1972). Whether section
14(e) entirely preempts 10b-5 in tender offer situations or merely provides an alterna-
tive remedy remains to be seen.
88. "Without question, such broad interpretation of the Rule are ...necessary
in order to vitalize the antifraud purposes of the Rule and the securities laws."
Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 39 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
appeal docketed, No. 71-2223, 9th Cir., July 15, 1971.
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in that it restricts access to the federal courts. Such restriction is
thought to be desirable because, by confining lOb-5 standing within
predetermined bounds, a court can protect prospective defendants from
nuisance suits, itself from a deluge of 1Ob-5 litigation, and persons
dealing in securities from uncertain and unlimited liability. In addi-
tion, some courts go beyond these practical considerations and argue
that problems involving separation of powers and federalism mandate
a limiting doctrine such as Birnbaum.
Nuisance Suits
The belief is sometimes expressed by the courts that a liberal
standing requirement affords no protection against a plaintiff who
brings suit with no intention of litigating, in hopes of forcing a well-
heeled defendant into a settlement. But at least two arguments mili-
tate against using a standing requirement to eliminate nuisance suits.
First, a limiting doctrine which cuts down on the number of all
lawsuits brought will have the effect of arbitrarily eliminating legiti-
mate as well as illegitimate claims. For example, a requirement that
no left-handed person could bring a 10b-5 action would indeed cut
down on the number of fraudulent plaintiffs, but it would also sup-
press the legitimate claims of left-handed plaintiffs who had suffered
injury as a result of another's fraud. Additionally, such arbitrary
limitations are underinclusive in that they fail to protect against nui-
sance suits brought by persons who do have standing. That is, the
hypothetical standing limitation in no way would eliminate the fraud-
ulent claims of right-handed persons.
More importantly, it is a distortion of priorities to favor a policy
which focuses on reducing the number of actions brought rather than
on remedying injuries suffered. Although it is desirable to eliminate
sham lawsuits, it is correspondingly undesirable to do so at the expense
of persons who are genuinely injured as the result of another's wrong-
doing.8 9
89. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, seem to represent an
attempt to limit sham suits by deterrence rather than by a method which limits all
lawsuits brought. Rule 11 requires that the attorneys sign the pleadings to certify that
there is good ground for support of the claim presented. An attorney who wilfully
violates Rule 11 "may be subject to appropriate disciplinary action," which probably
means a contempt citation. Rule 23.1 requires the plaintiff in a derivative action to
"verify" that the action is not "a collusive one to confer jurisdiction" on the court.
Apparently, a false verification could result in a prosecution for perjury.
The deterrent effect of Rules 11 and 23.1, however, may not be strong enough to
prevent nuisance suits because the burden of showing that the plaintiff's conduct was
wilfully fraudulent often cannot be sustained. Nevertheless, nuisance suits are better
eliminated by improved methods of deterrence rather than by limitations on standing.
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Floodgates
Some courts seem to approve Birnbaum, at least implicitly, be-
cause it insulates the federal courts from the flood of litigation which
would result if the standing requirement were drastically liberalized.
Such a consideration seems irrelevant to the issue of standing; rather,
judicial emphasis should be directed at whether, in light of Congres-
sional intent and public policy, a person is a proper party to litigate.
If the plaintiff has standing on these bases, a refusal by a federal court
to hear the dispute would be an abdication of its duty to adjudicate.
A corollary to this "floodgates" approach is that Birnbaum is a
competent tool, not necessarily to limit lOb-5 actions in general, but
rather to weed out those spurious actions in which the plaintiff attempts
to invoke federal jurisdiction over what is basically a state claim. As
stated by one court:
The complaint herein is representative of a growing number of
lOb-5 suits brought in this Court on unique, esoteric and im-
plausible legal theories. Innovation is not to be discouraged, nor
the imaginative instinct dulled. However, claims cloaked in a tissue
of confusion devoid of federal jurisdiction or legal merit, impede
rather than foster progress in the field of investor protection.90
The most persuasive reason for not using Birnbaum to screen
state actions is that it is inappropriate and ineffective for that purpose.
Any filtering accomplished by use of Birnbaum occurs in a haphazard
manner, for there seems to be little correlation between purchaser or
seller status and legitimacy of a federal claim. By imposing a pre-
trial condition applicable to all lOb-5 actions, the courts preclude some
parties with legitimate federal grievances from suing, and correspond-
ingly fail to eliminate some actions which seem to be founded on tra-
ditional state grounds. An instance of the latter situation occurs when
a plaintiff asserts that the defendant contracted to buy securities from
him but did not pay for them after delivery. This transaction seems
to give rise to no more than a breach of contract action, but if the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant entered into the agreement with no
intention of paying for the securities, and therefore was fraudulent,
1Ob-5 standing could be granted under Birnbaum.91
90. Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
91. In Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Tex. 1972) the court,
confronted with such an allegation stated: "'whether there is an actionable fraud or a
mere breach of contract depends on the facts and circumstances developed at the trial
or on motion for summary judgment."' Id. at 1002, quoting, A.T. Brod & Co. v.
Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). See also A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d
393 (2d Cir. 1967); Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). But see E.L. Aaron & Co. v. Free, [Current Binder] CCH Fo. SEc. L. REP.
93,598, at 92,755 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1972).
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Limitation of Liability
Another purported justification for a strict standing requirement is
that the language of Rule 1Ob-5 is so broad that it can be interpreted
to create "an almost completely undefined liability" 2 because it only
requires that " 'someone do something bad'-"8 in order to violate it.
If some sort of limitation were not imposed, it is argued, persons in
business could never be certain when their conduct would subject them
to liability. Certainty in business transactions, however, is accom-
plished by clearly defining what conduct is fraudulent rather than by
limiting which persons may sue for injuries suffered. A limitation on
standing adds to the certainty of business dealings only in the sense
that it defines the class of persons who can be defrauded with im-
punity, and the attainment of such "certainty" by excluding persons in-
jured by fraudulent dealings in securities exalts certainty over funda-
mental fairness.
Separation of Powers
Some courts have partially based their refusal to overturn the Birn-
baum doctrine on the ground that to do so would involve the courts
in the legislative function of Congress. 94 Blau v. Lehman, a Supreme
Court case dealing with section 16(b), is frequently cited:
Congress can and might amend §16(b) if the Commission would
present to it the policy arguments it has presented to us, but we
think that Congress is the proper agency to change an interpreta-
tion of the Act unbroken since its passage, if the change is to be
made.05
This argument ignores two facts: first, the purchaser-seller require-
ment is itself a court-created doctrine based on an interpretation of
legislative intent. Courts can validly reinterpret such a doctrine with-
out engaging in judicial legislation. Second, as discussed earlier, the
Birnbaum rule has undergone substantial judicial change, and it is
therefore misleading to interject the Blau v. Lehman holding since there
the Court was considering an interpretation of section 16(b), which
was "unbroken since its passage."
Although Congress may be better equipped to make major
changes in securities legislation, the courts are also appropriate instru-
ments to accommodate changing social needs. Courts should not feel
92. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970).
93. Id. citing R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURrrIES REGULATION 961 (2d ed.
1968).
94. See, e.g., Mt. Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir.
1972); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
95. 368 U.S. 403, 413 (1962) (emphasis added).
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bound by judicial mandates which are out of step with current social
conditions.
Federalism
Courts unanimously agree that section 10(b) was not intended to
regulate fraud which only amounts to internal mismanagement of cor-
porate affairs.96 Although fraudulent mismanagement conceivably
could be federally regulated under the Commerce Clause, regulation
traditionally has been a state function. Therefore federal proscriptions
regarding corporate mismanagement should not develop judicially un-
der a statute intended for another purpose, but should be the product
of specific Congressional mandate. The distinction between breach of
corporate fiduciary duty and activities affecting securities, however,
has never been clearly delineated. It is frequently said that when the
two overlap, the injured party may seek a remedy in either the federal
or state courts. 97  For example, where the fraud of the corporate offi-
cers causes a shareholder to part with securities, an action will lie under
1Ob-5 and for breach of fiduciary duty.
However, the courts seem to feel that to discard Birnbaum, and
to adopt in its place a test similar to that once offered by the SEC-
that a person has lOb-5 standing if the fraud of another influences his
judgment to buy, sell or hold securities 98-inevitably would involve the
courts in the regulation of internal corporate mismanagement."9 For
instance, a stockholder-plaintiff would need only allege that the fraud-
ulent mismanagement of the corporation by its officers, by decreasing
the worth of the corporation and correspondingly decreasing the value
of the plaintiffs shares, was aimed at forcing him to sell his shares.
A 1Ob-5 action could therefore lie for almost any breach of fiduciary
duty, since such breaches usually have the effect of at least indirectly
reducing the worth of the corporation. The courts reason that such
an expansive test of standing under lOb-5 would encroach into an area
traditionally regulated by the states, and one not intended to be covered
by section 10(b).
It is submitted that if the plaintiff-stockholder in the above situa-
tion can prove that the fraudulent scheme of the corporate officers was
96. See notes 17 and 55 supra. In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized this principle: "We
agree that Congress by 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which [amounted]
to no more than internal corporate mismanagement."
97. E.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 1970); New Park Min-
ing Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
98. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1970).
99. See, e.g., Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 999 (1971).
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intended to force him to sell out, he should be afforded lOb-5 standing
to halt the practice and recover damages for any injury which he may
have suffered. Indeed, the wording of the Rule itself seems to pro-
hibit such conduct. The argument that abandonment of Birnbaum
would result in federal judicial regulation of corporate fiduciary duties
is actually a fear that some shareholders might bring actions for fraud
which is not in connection with a purchase or sale of securities. But
a shareholder who can show an actual injury resulting from the de-
fendant's fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
should be entitled to sue whether or not the plaintiff is the purchaser
or seller.
The Case for Discarding Birnbaum
10b-5 Language and the SEC
As noted above, the fact that the language of Rule 1Ob-5 is very
broad seems to militate against a narrow standing requirement. Fraud
on "any person" is prohibited, not merely fraud on purchasers and
sellers; and the fraud must be "in connection with" the purchase or
sale of securities rather than "in the purchase or sale." Indeed, the
SEC, which drafted lOb-5, for a number of years has urged that the
courts abandon Birnbaum and adopt a test which would be more in
line with the expansive language of the Rule and the public policy be-
hind the Securities Exchange Act. 0 0
The SEC's motive in supporting such a broad interpretation may
stem from its own limited power to enforce 1Ob-5. The SEC may
obtain an injunction against fraudulent conduct and may also pass
along its investigatory findings to the Attorney General's office for pos-
sible prosecution. 1 ' Nevertheless, injunctive relief is not as effective
a deterrent as a private action for damages. The former requires only,
that the party engaged in a fraudulent activity refrain from doing so,
whereas an action for damages carries with it the additional "sting" of
requiring the defendant to pay for his wrongdoing. Thus, the private
action for damages deters the particular defendant from wrongdoing in
the future and warns other potential defendants against engaging in
similar fraudulent conduct.
Moreover, the limited resources of the SEC prevent effective polic-
ing of many violations of the Securities Exchange Act, so that enforce-
ment through private damages actions is a necessary supplement to gov-
ernmental action. In addition, often private individuals are likely to
learn of ongoing fraud earlier than the SEC, and the more prompt the
100. See, e.g., Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Manor Drugs v. Blue Chip
Stamps, appeal docketed, No. 71-2223, 9th Cir., July 15, 1971.
101. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
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enforcement, the more likely the prophylactic function of the Act will
be effectuated. Although the SEC's purpose in promulgating lOb-5
originally may have been somewhat ambiguous, courts should consider
the SEC's current position as persuasive evidence that Birnbaum is at
odds with proper enforcement of 1 Ob-5 fraud violations.
Inconsistencies
Although the Birnbaum rule can be faulted because it allows cer-
tain types of securities fraud to go unpunished for want of a proper
plaintiff, the primary weakness of the rule is that it denies a federal
remedy to numerous persons injured by a lOb-5 violation. It is in re-
sponse to this possibility that the courts have expanded the classes of
purchaser and seller in order to allow more persons to sue under lOb-5.
Such expansion is laudable, but because it has taken place within the
basic Birnbaum framework certain inconsistencies have developed.
For instance, recognition in the merger situation that shareholders
in the target corporation are sellers and purchasers when they exchange
shares pursuant to a merger is logical, but the same reasoning denies
individual lOb-5 standing to shareholders in the surviving corporation
since they cannot logically be classified as purchasers or sellers be-
cause they have exchanged no shares. 1°2 As a result, surviving share-
holders who may suffer the same type of injury as target shareholders
are not allowed an individual action and must sue, if at all, in a de-
rivative capacity.
In the aborted and delayed purchaser-seller cases, the emerging
law appears to distinguish between those persons who, subsequent to
the inducement not to act, have purchased or sold securities, and those
who have not.10 3 Persons in the former category are afforded lOb-5
standing on the theory that they are actual purchasers or sellers, while
persons in the latter category are denied standing unless they are par-
ties to a contractual relationship which elevates them to the status of
purchasers or sellers. The distinction between these two classes is en-
tirely one of form rather than substance. In each instance the injury
is a result of the defendant's fraudulent inducement not to act, and in
each instance the defrauded party may be injured in the same manner
and to the same extent. The fact that a party later purchases or sells
securities seems irrelevant to the question of whether he has suffered
harm as a result of the defendant's fraud.
Mutual Shares Approach
By employing the Birnbaum rule as a standing requirement, the
102. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
103. See notes 39-73 and accompanying text supra.
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federal courts have ignored the fact that standing is basically a consti-
tutional case or controversy question. °4 Except in unusual circum-
stances, 10 5 a person should be allowed standing when he can allege
"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues."106
In the context of lOb-5, a person has a personal stake in the contro-
versy when his interest in securities has been injured or is threatened.
In either instance, the issue of 1Ob-5 fraud is justiciable and standing
should be allowed.
This approach apparently was taken by the court in Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc. °7 where the Second Circuit allowed standing to
a nonpurchaser or seller who sought injunctive relief. There the plain-
tiffs were a group of minority shareholders who alleged that the de-
fendants, the controlling shareholders, were forcing them to sell out
by keeping dividends low. The court disallowed the claim for damages
because the plaintiffs, as nonsellers, had "as yet sustained no monetary
injury,"'0° and therefore could not possibly show that any damages
were causally related to the fraud of the defendants. The fact that
other shareholders had sold at depressed prices did not, in the court's
opinion, establish an injury to the plaintiffs. Nonetheless, the court
allowed the plaintiffs to sue for injunctive relief under 1Ob-5 because
[T]he claim for injunctive relief largely avoids [the issues of pres-
ent injury and causal connection between injury to others and
104. Two courts have suggested that the Birnbaum rule is required as a matter
of constitutional law. See Mt. Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 343 (9th
Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805-06 (5th Cir. 1970). But the court
in H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153, 166 (D.R.I. 1973)
(supplemental opinion), placed the issue in the correct perspective when it stated:
"While . . . the requirements of standing under the Constitution may frequently coin-
cide [with the purchaser-seller rule] in particular cases, they are by no means co-
extensive, in this Court's opinion. The Court has no doubt that plaintiff [who was
denied lob-5 standing because not a purchaser or seller] has standing in the consti-
tutional sense."
105. Ordinary requirements for standing may be altered where Congress specifi-
cally limits the class of persons who can sue under a statute it enacts. The standing
issue may also be complicated in situations where the plaintiff sues the government or
a governmental agency. The test of standing to sue in either case seems to be the
two-pronged test announced in Association of Data Processing Serv., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970): (1) plaintiff must allege an "injury in fact, economic or
otherwise;" and (2) the court must determine "whether the interest sought to be pro-
tected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." But see Davis,
The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970) (advocating injury
in fact as sole test of standing).
106. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
107. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
108. Id. at 546.
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injury to the plaintiff], may cure harm suffered by continuing
shareholders, and would afford complete relief against the Rule
10b-5 violation for the future.
10 9
The Mutual Shares court apparently did not consider the pur-
chaser-seller limitation to be a per se standing requirement in actions
under 10b-5. It did not discuss Birnbaum, but mentioned it as one of
the "various concepts. . . utilized to limit liability under the sweeping
language of . . .Rule [10b-5]"110 and noted that "none [of the limit-
ing concepts were] specifically required by [the Rule].""'
The approach of the court toward standing has definite merit.
The fact that the plaintiff in a damages action has not sold is an indi-
cation that no injury has been suffered, though nonseller status is not
conclusive on the standing issue. Where injunctive relief is sought
to prevent a threatened injury, whether the plaintiff is a purchaser or
seller is even less informative on the issue of whether the alleged wrong-
doing threatens him.
Current Status of Birnbaum
The federal courts seem almost unanimous in their current ap-
proval of the expanded purchaser-seller requirement."' Mutual Shares
is often reconciled, 113 at least in dictum, as announcing the injunctive
relief "exception" 1 4 to the purchaser-seller rule, rather than as signify-
ing a different approach to the 10b-5 standing question." 5  Neverthe-
less, courts have failed to apply the purchaser-seller rule from time to
time, and there is at least some evidence of a trend to reexamine Birn-
baum.
109. Id. at 547.
110. Id. at 543.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Cf. Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305, 1311-14 (2d Cir. 1972); Mt.
Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341-45 (9th Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wall-
ace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-09 (5th Cir. 1970); Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795, 797-99
(8th Cir. 1970); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); Iroquois
Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 41.7 F.2d 963, 967-69 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 909 (1970); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1968);
Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 791 (8th Cir. 1967).
113. See, e.g., Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303,
308 n.5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d
792, 813 (5th Cir. 1970); Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795, 797 n.4 (8th Cir. 1970);
Edelman v. Decker, 337 F. Supp. 582, 584-85 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Dyer v. Eastern Trust
& Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 911 n.35 (D. Me. 1971).
114. Since a plaintiff may sue derivatively without personally having purchased or
sold, derivative actions could be said to represent a second, well recognized "excep-
tion" to Birnbaum. Presumably, however, the corporation in such a situation must
be a purchaser or seller. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
115. Failure to realize that the Mutual Shares court was approaching standing
from a different angle has resulted in a confused body of case law surrounding the
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The first court which declined to follow Birnbaum was Entel v.
Allen'" where shareholders in Atlas Corporation alleged that Atlas
sold its interest in another company to Hughes Tool Company (Tooles)
without disclosing to the shareholders that Howard Hughes dominated
both Atlas and Tooles, and that, therefore, the sale was not negotiated
at arm's length. The court interpreted the Second Circuit decisions
of Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co. 1 7 and A.T. Brod & Co. v. Per-
low" 8 as "seriously challeng[ing], if not overrul[ing] ' 1" 9 Birnbaum,
and allowed the shareholders standing even though they were not pur-
chasers or sellers. The court expressed reluctance in allowing the
1Ob-5 action, but felt compelled to do so:
Although this Court feels that the extension of Section 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5 to nonpurchasers-or-sellers . . . . would be better
left to Congress than to judicial interpretation, it is bound to follow
the decisions of this circuit.'
20
Actually, neither Brod nor Vine dealt with the purchaser-seller re-
quirement. As noted earlier, 2 ' the plaintiff in Brod was regarded as
a purchaser and the court did not consider the contention of the SEC
as amicus curiae that the Birnham rule should be rejected. 22  Like-
wise, in Vine the SEC suggested that the plaintiff in a 1Ob-5 action
need not be a purchaser or seller in order to have standing so long as
so-called injunctive relief exception. One uncertainty is whether the exception applies
in situations, unlike Mutual Shares, where there has not been a market manipulation
of publicly owned securities. See Hirschleifer v. Fran-Tronics Corp., [Current Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,681, at 93,028 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1972); General Time
Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400, 403 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Puharich v. Borders Electronics Co., Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 92,141, at 96,653 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1968). Another court has used
Mutual Shares as authority for holding that the elements of fraud which must be
proved are less stringent in an injunctive relief action than in an action for damages,
even though the Mutual Shares court was concerned only with standing and did not
deal with the substantive elements of the alleged fraud. See Britt v. Cyril Bath Co.,
417 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1969) (plaintiff was a seller so injunctive relief excep-
tion was not considered in conjunction with the standing issue).
At least one court, however, seems to recognize that Mutual Shares announced an
"approach" rather than an exception. In Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co. [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REv. 92,591, at 98,701 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31,
1969), the court notes that Mutual Shares "obviously negates some of the restricted
interpretation set forth in Birnbaum." Id. at 98,704. See note 41 supra.
116. 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Another case in which non-purchasers-
or-sellers were allowed lOb-5 standing is Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) decided by the same district judge who wrote the Entel opinion.
117. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
118. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
119. 270 F. Supp. at 69.
120. Id. at 70.
121. See notes 80-81 and accompanying text supra.
122. 375 F.2d at 397 n.3.
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the fraud of the defendant violated the Rule and the plaintiff's holdings
lost value as a result. 2 ' The court dismissed this assertion as an "in-
teresting contention,"' 2  but one which need not be decided since the
court had deemed the plaintiff a seller, albeit a forced one.12 5  Thus,
neither Vine nor Brod reached the question of whether the purchaser-
seller requirement should be abandoned. The view of the Entel court
that these cases seriously challenged Birnbaum was, unfortunately, er-
roneous, and later cases make clear that the Second Circuit continues
to adhere to the purchaser-seller requirement.1
2
Nevertheless, the Birnbaum doctrine recently was repudiated by
the New Jersey district court in Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc.127 The
plaintiffs, Class A shareholders in Wakefern Corporation, alleged that
the directors of Wakefern had shifted the voting control of Wakefern
by fraudulently passing a resolution offering a bloc of Class A treasury
shares to themselves and other holders of Class B and C shares. The
defendant-directors challenged the court's jurisdiction under lOb-5 on
the ground that the plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers. The
court rejected this argument, stating that "[the defendants seek] to re-
vive the spectre of the Birnbaum buyer-seller doctrine at a point in
time when both courts and legal scholars are seeking to bury it.'
2
8
Undoubtably the court was correct that the weight of law review mate-
rial on the subject advocates either a very flexible application of Birn-
baum or its total rejection.'2 9 However, the court's assertion that the
case law generally seeks to bury Birnbaum appears to be somewhat
of an overstatement.
First the court invoked language from the recent Supreme Court
opinion in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
123. 374 F.2d at 636.
124. Id.
125. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra.
126. See Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305, 1311-14 (2d Cir. 1972); Iro-
quois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1968).
127. 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.NJ. 1972).
128. Id. at 839.
129. E.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968); Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law of
Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAw.
1289 (1971) (flexible construction urged); Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to
SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 684 (1968); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller
Rule: An Archaic Tool for Determining Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEo. L.J
1177 (1968); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Requirement Reevaluated, 44 U. CoLO.
L. REv. 151 (1972); Comment, The Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of
Rule 10b-5, 14 VLL. L. Rlv. 499 (1969). But see Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain
Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20 BUFF.uo
U. REV. 93 (1970).
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that "[slection 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and re-
strictively. '" 1 30  Reliance on the Bankers Life language is misleading
because in that case the Court expressly declined to pass on the status
of the purchaser-seller rule.131 The plaintiff in Bankers Life was a
seller of bonds, and the succeeding sentence to the Court's "flexibility"
language acknowledged that fact: "Since there was a 'sale' of a security
and since fraud was used 'in connection with' it there is redress under
§ 10(b) . ,,132
Furthermore, reliance on this oft-cited language is of little aid when
considering the purchaser-seller requirement since other courts employ
the same passage to argue that Birnbaum is still good law. For exam-
ple, one court has stated:
In our view, there has been no erosion of Birnbaum. Rather,
the doctrine formulated therein has been interpreted and applied
"flexibly, not technically and restrictively" . . . thus promoting
the Congressional purpose in the enactment of this remedial legis-
lation.' 33
The Tully court also relied on Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co.'34 and Kahan v. Rosenstiel35 as precedents for the rejection
of the purchaser-seller requirement. As noted earlier, 3 6 Crane is most
often reconciled within the Birnbaum doctrine as a forced seller case.
Moreover, even if Crane is not viewed as a forced seller case, there is
no apparent reason to afford greater weight to Crane than to subse-
quent Second Circuit cases which explicitly affirm Birnbaum's standing
requirement.'1
7
The Tully court's reliance on Kahan as a renunciation of Birn-
baum, however, may have been justified. Although the Kahan court
was considering only the issue of whether a nonpurchaser-or-seller
could maintain a 10b-5 action for injunctive relief, and could therefore
be interpreted as adopting the Mutual Shares "exception,"'3 8 the court's
language suggests that, regardless of the type of relief sought, the 1Ob-5
plaintiff need be neither a purchaser nor a seller in order to have stand-
ing.
Neither the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 nor the policy
they were designed to effectuate mandate adherence to a strict
130. 404 U.S. at 12.
131. Id. at 13-14. See generally Note, Bankers Life: Paying for a Corporation
by Selling Its Securities Violates 10b-5, 1972 DuKe L.J. 465, 479-80.
132. 404 U.S. at 12.
133. Mt. Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1972).
134. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
135. 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
136. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
137. E.g., Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305, 1311-14 (2d Cir. 1972).
138. See notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
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purchaser-seller requirement so as to preclude suits for relief if
a plaintiff can establish a causal connection between the violations
alleged and the plaintiff's loss.
139
Both Tully and Kahan adopt a causal test for standing. That is,
the plaintiff in a lOb-5 action has standing to sue "where there is a
causal connection between the purchase or sale of stock, the alleged
fraud . . and plaintiff's loss . . ."140 This test obviously disregards
the purchaser-seller rule as a 10b-5 standing requirement, and its lib-
erality is encouraging. Other courts have not gone as far, but there
appears to be a trend emerging at least to reexamine Birnbaum.
For instance, three recent cases which do not reject the purchaser-
seller doctrine outright nevertheless appear to indicate dissatisfaction
with Birnbaum. In Travis v. Anthes Imperial Limited,'4' plaintiff was
allowed standing on alternative grounds as either a delayed seller or
a forced seller. But the Eighth Circuit did not stop there. Instead, in
an ambiguously worded dictum, the court responded to the SEC's re-
quest to abandon the purchaser-seller requirement as follows:
We decline to do so here, but emphasize that the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 is remedial legislation which should be con-
strued broadly to effectuate its purpose ... and that "10(b)
must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively."'
142
By invoking the Bankers Life 43 language the court intimated that it
would discard Birnbaum whenever the court feels that the purchaser-
seller requirement fails to effectuate the remedial purposes of the Ex-
change Act. In essence this may mean that the Eighth Circuit will
not follow Birnbaum when, in the court's opinion, "justice" is not
served by application of the purchaser-seller rule.
In H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 44 the plaintiffs tender
offer for Nicholson stock was defeated when Nicholson sent a series
of letters to its shareholders urging them to refrain from tendering.
The letters allegedly contained fraudulent representations that Nichol-
son would soon merge and its shareholders would receive more for
their shares than under Porter's tender offer. The facts of the case
so closely resembled Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.
45
that the Rhode Island district court felt compelled to deny standing
solely under constraint of that decision. In so doing, however, the
139. 424 F.2d at 173.
140. Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 842 (D.N.J. 1972).
141. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973). See notes 30-31 and 51-55 and accompany-
ing text supra.
142. Id. at 521 n.9.
143. See notes 130-33 and accompanying text supra.
144. 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972).
145. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). See
notes 74-87 and accompanying text supra.
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court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the Second Circuit decisions
in Iroquois and Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.'4 6 The
court interpreted the latter decision not as a forced seller case but as
an enunciation that 10b-5 standing "turned on a showing of a causal
connection between the fraud and the damage claim . . . ."'I The
court made clear that it preferred the result in Crane, but nevertheless
felt bound by Iroquois since "subsequent decisions have sought to limit
Crane and have reaffirmed Iroquois."""
Similar doubt over the continued validity of Birnbaum was man-
ifested by the district court for the southern district of New York in
Competitive Associates, Inc. v. International Health Services, Inc.149
There the plaintiff was not a purchaser or seller, but the court refused
to deny standing on this ground. Instead, the plaintiffs claim was dis-
allowed because he had failed to allege an actionable injury.
If Birnbaum is still good authority . . . then [plaintiff's] complaint
must be dismissed. We would prefer however to stand on other or
additional and broader grounds for dismissing [plaintiff's] com-
plaint. The complaint does not plead the basis for any injuries
suffered by [plaintiff]. 150
The trepidation of the Travis, Porter and Competitive courts is
founded on the general belief that Birnbaum might no longer be good
authority. In light of the vast majority of cases dealing with 1Ob-5
standing which accept the purchaser-seller rule, such fear is probably
ill-founded. Nevertheless, these three cases, along with Tully and Ka-
han, represent an encouraging judicial trend at least to examine very
closely the applicability of the Birnbaum doctrine.
Conclusion
The federal courts have greatly liberalized the Birnbaum standing
requirement by expanding the terms purchaser and seller to include
more persons who are injured as a result of securities fraud. Despite
this liberalization, the basic Birnbaum framework continues intact and
1Ob-5 accordingly is not fully effective in remedying injuries suffered
by nonpurchasers-or-sellers as the result of fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities.
It is suggested that the courts discard Birnbaum and adopt a
standing test which is more akin to the constitutional case or contro-
146. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). See
notes 74-87 and accompanying text supra.
147. H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153, 161 (D.R.I. 1972).
148. Id. at 166 (supplemental opinion).
149. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,632, at 92,868 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 10, 1972).
150. Id. at 92,870.
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versy standard and the approach taken in Mutual Shares Corp. v. Gen-
esco, Inc.'51 Such a test would require only that the plaintiff allege
an injury in fact in a damages action and a threatened injury where in-
junctive relief is sought. The fact that the plaintiff is neither a pur-
chaser or seller should not be conclusive on the issue of standing, but
should serve merely as a factor to be considered in determining whether
the plaintiff actually has suffered an injury.
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151. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). See notes 107-11 and accompanying text
supra.
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